

Resource Certification (RPKI)

Marco Hogewoning
RIPE NCC
(marcoh@ripe.net)

MENOG 10, Dubai UAE



Resource Certificates – The Goal

- Issue digital certificates along with the allocation of Internet Resources
- Two main purposes:
 - Make the Registry more robust
 - Make Internet routing more secure
- Validation is the added value



The RIPE NCC involvement in RPKI

- The authority on who is the registered holder of an Internet Number Resource in our region
 - IPv4 and IPv6 Address Blocks
 - Autonomous System Numbers
- Information is kept in the Registry
- Accuracy and completeness are key

Discussion in Tech Community since 1990s

- Aug 1998: IDR Working Group at IETF 42
 - BGP is vulnerable to attacks due to the lack of a scalable means of ensuring the authenticity and legitimacy of BGP control traffic
- Feb 2000: Secure Border Gateway Protocol
 - Real World Performance and Deployment Issues; paper by S. Kent, C. Lynn, J. Mikkelsen, and K. Seo
- Sept 2003: IETF Internet Draft
 - X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers

Digital Resource Certificates

- Resource Certification is a free, opt-in service
 - Your choice to request a certificate
 - Linked to registration
 - Renewed every 12 months
- Certificate does not list any identity information



Management: Your Choice

- Open Source Software to run a member CA
 - Use the RIPE NCC as parent CA (trust anchor)
 - Generate and publish Certificate yourself
- RIPE NCC Hosted Platform
 - All processes are secured and automated
 - One click set-up of Resource Certificate
 - WebUI to manage Certificates in LIR Portal

How to Secure Routing

- Using the resource certificate the holder can make a statement on how those resources should be routed:

“I, the certified holder, authorise this Autonomous System to announce the route for these prefixes”

Route Origin Authorisations

- Only the registered holder of a Internet number resource can create a valid ROA
- A ROA affects the RPKI validity of a route announcement:
 - VALID: ROA found, authorised announcement
 - INVALID: ROA found, unauthorised announcement
 - UNKNOWN: No ROA found (resource not yet signed)

Publication of Cryptographic Objects

- Publication is distributed by design
 - Publish yourself or publish through a 3rd party
- Each RIR has a public repository
 - Holds Certificates, ROAs, etc.
 - Refreshed at least every 24 hrs
- Accessed using a Validation tool
 - Communication via rsync
 - Builds up a local validated cache



RIPE NCC RPKI Validation tool

RIPE NCC RPKI-RTR Validator

- Web-based user interface
- Periodically validates all ROA repositories
 - Downloads and processes changes automatically
- Ignore Filters (Apply RPKI status ‘Unknown’)
- Whitelist (Apply RPKI status ‘Valid’)
- RPKI-Router Support
 - Cisco, Juniper, Quagga...

Open source, BSD License

RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 2.0.3

RPKI Validator - BGP Preview

RPKI Validator Home Trust Anchors ROAs Ignore Filters Whitelist **BGP Preview** Export Router Sessions rpkirtr log

Show 10 entries Search: 85/8

ASN	Prefix	Validity
20597	85.249.224.0/19	VALID
20597	85.249.8.0/21	VALID
35063	85.237.160.0/19	VALID
15456	85.236.32.0/19	VALID
13110	85.221.128.0/17	VALID
6714	85.219.128.0/17	VALID
6724	85.214.0.0/15	VALID
34619	85.159.71.0/24	VALID
34619	85.159.70.0/24	VALID
34619	85.159.69.0/24	VALID

First Previous 1 2 3 4 5 Next Last

Showing 1 to 10 of 2,696 entries (filtered from 418,780 total entries)

Feedback

Copyright © 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 the Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre RIPE NCC. All rights restricted.

Router Configuration – Cisco

```
!  
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 10  
  match rpki invalid  
  set local-preference 90  
!  
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 20  
  match rpki not-found  
  set local-preference 100  
!  
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 30  
  match rpki valid  
  set local-preference 110
```


Router Configuration – Juniper

```
policy-options {
  policy-statement route-validation {
    term valid {
      from {
        validation-state valid;
      }
      then {
        local-preference 110;
        validation-state valid;
        accept;
      }
    }
    term invalid {
      from {
        validation-state invalid;
      }
      then {
        local-preference 90;
        validation-state invalid;
        accept;
      }
    }
    term unknown {
      from {
        validation-state unknown;
      }
      then {
        local-preference 100;
        validation-state unknown;
        accept;
      }
    }
  }
}
```

RPKI Capable Test Routers

- Cisco
 - rпки-rtr.ripe.net
 - telnet username: ripe, no password
 - “sh ip bgp 193.0.24.0/21 (or your prefix)”, “sh ip bgp rпки table”, “sh ip bgp ipv6 unicast rпки table”, “sh ip bgp rпки server”
- Juniper
 - juniper.rпки.netsign.net
 - telnet username: rпки, password: testbed
 - “show validation session detail”, “show validation statistics”, “show validation database”, “show route protocol bgp validation-state valid”

Resource Certification Adoption



Latest News

- RIPE NCC Validator 2.1.0 released 24-04-2012
 - Interface improvements
- Cisco has production releases for RPKI
 - 7600, ASR 1000, ASR 901, ASR 903
 - IOS 15.2(1)S or XE 3.5
- Early Field Trial for other platforms
 - CSR 1, CSR 3, ASR 9000, c12K (IOS-XR)
 - Contact Cisco or RIPE NCC when interested

Information and Announcements

<http://ripe.net/certification>

 #RPKI

