



# Certification More Tangible

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# Drivers

- RIR's are implementing a solution to certify resources
  - APNIC and ARIN are implementing an RPKI engine
- Potential IPv4 marketplace: keeping it white
  - Need to be prepared when the stakes go up
  - An IPv4 black market could turn routing into chaos
- RIPE NCC has the task to uphold principles
  - Uniqueness
- Enhanced Registration Services
  - Increasing importance in relation with government, law enforcement...



# Progress since RIPE 55 Meeting


- Focus on business value for RIPE members
- Insight by starting implementation
- The added value of Certification
- Business cases more tangible
- Develop internal business processes to support Certification
- Closer contact with Task force
- More active involvement in technical discussions

# What is the value of a certificate?

Party

Resource

Signature

A photograph of a piece of aged parchment with handwritten text in a medieval script. A red wax seal is visible at the bottom center. The text is partially obscured by a blue box containing the words "Party", "Resource", and "Signature".

MORAVIA REGIOSCLAUORUM INU  
L...ENSIS ANNO DOMINI M  
... PATRICIUS BARTUS RATIFI  
... DIUS BRITANICUS F  
ETTERLANENSIS PER FICIO AB SA  
... TEMPLUM PER CI  
... AMERICANUSEAS HOCLIB  
ellusetsi gillumau  
thenti cumest

# What is the value of a certificate?

“Party holds a Resource...”

Party

Resource

Signature

ellusetsi  
thenti



gillumau  
cumest

# What is the value of a certificate?

“Party holds a Resource...”

Party

Resource

Signature

“...because RIPE  
NCC said so”

# What is the value of a certificate?

- *Do you believe that RIPE NCC is saying that?*
- *Do you trust what RIPE NCC is saying?*

“Party holds a Resource...”

Party

Resource

Signature

“...because RIPE NCC said so”



# What is the value of a certificate?

- *Do you believe that RIPE NCC is saying that?*
- *Do you trust what RIPE NCC is saying?*

“Party holds a Resource...”

Party

Resource

Signature


“...because RIPE NCC said so”

- Certification only answers the first question
- Certificates are not trust anchors, the registry is!



# It's all about Allocations

- Allocations are RIPE NCC's core concept
- Connect a party to an IP Resource





# Certificates vs. Allocations

- A certificate is **another representation** of an allocation
- Value of certificates is **only the added value** over other representations

RIPE NCC Internal DB  
RDBMS records

Allocation

RIPE DB  
RPSL format

cer·tif·i·cate

noun |sər'tifikit|

an official document attesting to a particular

- a document recording a particular event, such as a marriage, or death.
- a document describing a person's qualifications, such as a *certificate of immunization*.
- a document attesting to a person's achievement in a course of study or training : *graduate certificate in information technology*.
- a document attesting ~~ownership~~ **holdership** of a certain item : *a stock certificate*.





# Added value

- Certificates can be the international exchange standard between RIR's
- Could help automated provisioning
  - easier to prove holdership than through “detective work”
  - certified information in parseable format
- Support resource transfers
- (Long term) Could help future secure routing
  - fills need for a PKI infrastructure and trusted third party



# Certificates are not a prerequisite for:

- Transfer of allocations
  - Registry **can** do this without any form of electronic certification
  - Transfers have been done already
- Proof of holdership
  - Certificates are not the truth, they **only attest** the trust as held by the Registry
  - A certificate is only as valuable as the trust in the Registry
  - Holdership could be proven in other (non-electronic) ways



# The wider picture

- Our (development team's) primary goal may be getting certification implemented...
- but we can't do this in a vacuum!
  - How does policy affect certification?
  - How does certification affect RIPE NCC's processes?
  - Where does certification fit in the processes?
- There is a **strong interdependence** between technical implementation, processes and policy.



Even more tangible...





# Scenario



AS65000



MegaCorp



MiniCorp




10.0.0/21





# Scenario

Please  
route this network  
for me



10.0.0/21



AS65000



MegaCorp




MiniCorp




# Scenario

Please  
route this network  
for me



10.0.0/21



AS65000

**MEGACORP**

MegaCorp

Hmm, is MiniCorp  
**really the holder** of that  
resource?



MiniCorp



# Automated Provisioning

- Provisioning an IP Resource
  - Does Holder **really** hold the resource?
- Checking takes detective work
  - Takes manpower
  - Needs specific knowledge and skills
- Is there an easy and secure way?
  - Meet the Route Origination Authorization (ROA)

# Meet the ROA



“Holder of 10.0.0/21  
authorises AS65000  
to originate this prefix”

- Secure: only true holder can create
- One-sided: states permission of address space holder only
- Multiple ROAs for one prefix allowed



# Relation ROA – Resource Certificate



# Relation ROA – Resource Certificate



MiniCorp's  
resource certificate

# Relation ROA – Resource Certificate



One-time certificate  
(EE certificate)



MiniCorp's  
resource certificate



# Scenario: conversation

Please  
route this network  
for me

  
10.0.0/21



AS65000

**MEGACORP**

MegaCorp

Hmm, is MiniCorp  
**really the holder** of that  
resource?



MiniCorp



# Scenario: conversation

Please route this network for me

  
10.0.0/21

Hmm, is MiniCorp really the holder of that resource?



MiniCorp

**MEGACORP**

MegaCorp

Okay, please sign a ROA with my ASN   
AS65000



# Demo Automated Provisioning





# Thank you!

- RIPE Certification Task Force  
<http://www.ripe.net/ripe/tf/certification/index.html>
- APNIC Resource Certification Wiki  
<http://mirin.apnic.net/resourcecerts/wiki/index.php>
- IETF SIDR Working Group  
<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sidr/>