Supporting Unconditionally Secure Authentication within e-Government Infrastructure based on QKD

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#### Problem Statement

- It has been noticed that the speed of ICT advancement in developing, deploying, and using e-government infrastructures is much faster than the development and deployment of security services.
- Therefore, government organizations are still suffering from the existence and emerging of security risks.
- All available security solutions are only computationally-secure!

### Work Objective

The aim of this work is to show the importance and validation of including unconditionallysecure authentication services within egovernment infrastructure based on QKD.

The work highlights the basic requirements for a general framework that facilitates such inclusion and also introduces sample protocol modification.

#### **Authentication Techniques**

Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

Mathematical Authentication Techniques

**A-Codes** 

#### Digital Signatures


#### MACs vs. A-Codes

- MACs and A-codes can provide data integrity and data origin authentication.
- It is important to emphasize that MACs are only proven to be computationally secure while the security of A-codes is unconditional.
- Thus, MACs are suitable for short-term security but they are not useful for long-term (say 20 years) requirements, especially when considering new technologies like quantum computers.

### **Digital Signatures**

- Digital signatures are very widely used technology for ensuring unforgeability and non-repudiation of information.
- Digital signature schemes can be constructed for both computational security and unconditional security.

#### eGMMs vs. ISMMs




#### The proposed N-Tier framework architecture



#### **Basic security-related functions**



#### Typical deployment of key bank agents



#### Proposed key management and distribution approaches

Courier-based approach:

• This is the most traditional approach

Quantum cryptographicbased approach:


 Recently, there have been significant advancements in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Hybrid PKIbased approach:

 Properly combining QKD with public-key based authentication


# Why QKD?

- QC delivers cryptographic keys whose secrecy is guaranteed by the laws of physics.
- QC offers new methods of secure communications that are not threatened even by the power of quantum computers.
- In quantum cryptography, physically secure quantum key distribution can be combined with the mathematical security of the OTP cipher and/or information-theoretically secure authentication (based on universal hashing).


# Stand-alone QKD PTP link




### Optically switched QKD network



### **Trusted relays QKD network**




# "Full" quantum network



# QKDNs (Software)

- Tightly-coupled protocol stack strategy; secret random bits obtained from QKD (which is mainly a physical layer technology) are merged directly somehow into a conventional higher-layer security protocol suite. Thus, the consumer security protocol has to be modified to enable the integration of QKD within it.
- Loosely-coupled protocol stack strategy; the focus here is to develop original multi-layer protocol infrastructures that are dedicated to QKD networks. In such a case, the QKD network infrastructure can be viewed as a "new cryptographic primitive".

#### SSL/TLS Example



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### QKD Protocol Message Types.

	Message Type	Content
1-	start-quantum-transmission	null
2-	start-acknowledgement	null
3-	end-quantum-transmission	null
4-	end-acknowledgement	null
5-	synchronize-quantum-channel	timing information
6-	receiver-sifting	indices of detected pulses, detection bases
7-	sender-sifting	pulses' indices, transmission bases
8-	receiver-error-correction	reconciliation technique dependent
9-	sender-error-correction	reconciliation technique dependent
10-	set-equality	hashes of chosen sets
11-	equality-acknowledgement	null
12-	privacy-amp-parameters	parameters of the privacy amplification method
13-	privacy-amp-acknowledgement	null
14-	receiver-discussion	situation dependent
15-	sender-discussion	situation dependent
		-

### Conclusion

Using A-codes can offer additional security benefits especially in situations when <u>long-term</u> and/or significantly high level of security is required.

We advise A-codes based services for <u>G2G and</u>
<u>G2B</u> settings only in the first adaptation stage.

 It is possible in next stages to include <u>e-</u> <u>democracy</u> (especially e-voting)

### **Future Work**

Since our current implementation is mainly limited to simulation. Future work might consider prototype implementation on Intranet level.

Further investigation of hardware and software requirements of such systems for wired and/or wireless settings can also be considered.

